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Howell Harris
Coping with Competition: 
Cooperation and Collusion in the 
US Stove Industry, c.1870–1930
This article examines the attempts of several generations of 
manufacturers of cooking and heating appliances to manage 
competition in their very unconcentrated industry. They 
started with overt price-fi xing, which soon failed, then moved 
on to a variety of more effective techniques—particularly joint 
regulation with the aid of a strong craft union, and the adop-
tion of uniform cost-accounting and price-setting systems. 
The article illuminates the numerous ways in which a trade 
association could make cartel-like behavior work in an indus-
try whose structural characteristics were apparently unfavor-
able and also the importance of state intervention to shaping 
and eventually limiting this strategy.
n January 4, 1922, the US Senate directed the Federal Trade Com-
mission (F TC) to inquire into the house furnishings industries, 
“particularly to ascertain the organization and inter relation [sic] of 
corporations and fi rms engaged therein and whether there were unfair 
practices or methods of competition or restraint of trade.”1 It was con-
cerned about these manufacturers’ exceptional success in driving up 
prices for important consumer durable goods during the war and 
i mmediate postwar years, and maintaining them through the reces-
sion of 1920–21.2 The F TC responded to the senatorial mandate with a 
1 US Federal Trade Commission (USFTC), Annual Report for the Fiscal Year Ended June 
30, 1924 (Washington, D.C., 1924), 88. Thomas C. Blaisdell Jr., The Federal Trade Commis-
sion: An Experiment in the Control of Business (New York, 1932), ch. 6, situates this investi-
gation (summarized at 166–68) among many other attempts by the Commission to combat 
price-gouging through targeted research and publicity; Robert F. Himmelberg, The Origins 
of the National Recovery Administration: Business, Government, and the Trade Associa-
tion Issue, 1921–1933 (New York, 1976), 7–9, 12, 18–20, 36, remains the best guide to the 
tangled evolution of antitrust policy during the Harding administration.
2 USFTC, Report on the House Furnishings Industries, vol. 2: Household Stoves, 1 Oct. 
1923 (Washington, D.C., 1924), 3.
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prodigious research effort.3 This produced three long reports. The second 
of them, on the cooking- and heating-stove and warm-air furnace indus-
try, was published at the beginning of 1923. It made interesting reading.4
This industry should have been a textbook case of competitive capi-
talism. In 1921, it consisted of 395 separate establishments scattered 
across the country, producing solid-fuel (coal and wood), gas, and 
l iquid-fuel cooking and heating appliances. Some companies special-
ized in one fuel type, and, within that, even in just one kind of equip-
ment. Others, generally the older and larger fi rms, were more versatile, 
making a full range of stoves and furnaces. This was an industry of pro-
prietary capitalism and stand-alone close corporations, securely rooted 
in mid-size cities and primarily oriented toward regional markets. The 
F TC’s detailed examination of their ownership and management found 
hardly any evidence of interlocking shareholdings or directorships. Few 
companies had a nationwide presence or signifi cant market power. The 
great merger movement at the turn of the century had scarcely touched 
them. Barriers to entry were low, and there were no signifi cant returns 
to scale above a low threshold; indeed, the data the F TC gathered sug-
gested that, beyond a certain point, returns might even be negative. In 
1920–21, the most consistently profi table enterprises were those capi-
talized at between $150,000 and $400,000, rather than the lumbering 
giants an order of magnitude larger—i.e., efforts toward consolidation 
or even organic growth through reinvestment were contextually inap-
propriate, and proved diffi cult to sustain.5
Yet this was also an industry that had boosted its factory-gate prices 
about 176 percent from January 1916 until the postwar peak in 1920, 
against a 147 percent rise in the general price level, and succeeded in 
holding the line against defl ationary pressures through the following 
slump. Despite a collapse in the industry’s sales and bulging invento-
ries, by December 1922 its prices were still about 120 percent above the 
prewar fi gure, whereas the all-commodities index had fallen to a mere 
56 percent above.6
3 The inquiry cost $69,000, about $4.4 million at current prices, using the nominal GDP 
per capita method: USFTC Annual Reports, 1923–1925, Administrative Division, “Detailed 
Statement of Costs,” 1923, 23; 1924, 7; 1925, 6. 
4 Sources underpinning its 187-page report are in Records of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, Economic Division, Economic Investigations Files 1915–1938, RG122, National Ar-
chives and Records Administration, College Park, Md. (hereafter, National Archives). Key 
materials, including interviews with the National Association of Stove Manufacturers’ secre-
tary and documents from his offi ce, are in Box 2337 (hereafter, FTC Investigative File).
5 USFTC, Household Stoves, 45 (industry divisions), 89 (stand-alone fi rms), 52–53 (scale 
diseconomies). According to the industry’s own count, in 1922 there were about 240 solid-
fuel and gas appliance makers, the constituency among which its trade associations recruited: 
“Lists of Stove Manufacturers” [1922], FTC Investigative File, National Archives.
6 USFTC, Household Stoves, 1 (price levels), 53, 74–76 (sales and inventories).
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Almost as impressive was the way in which repeated advances and 
modest reductions in prices had been effected: as organized, synchro-
nized movements initiated by manufacturers themselves, rather than as 
inchoate responses to market signals. It might be expected that indi-
vidualistic and presumably competitive manufacturers would have be-
haved differently from one another as a result of their size, effi ciency, 
profi tability, market location, or other particular distinctions. The evi-
dence the F TC gathered, however, was that in fact they all did much the 
same thing at much the same time, and maintained a common, stable, 
and high price level.7
There were signifi cant differences in the effect of this policy on 
companies’ bottom lines. In 1920, when the industry’s overall rate of 
return on investment was 15.6 percent, the results for the seventy-eight 
manufacturers (representing about 60 percent of the industry’s output, 
i.e., generally the larger fi rms) from whom F TC investigators could se-
cure usable data ranged from 3.5 to 50 percent. The following year, 
after a 40 percent decrease in sales, rates of return ranged from −34 to 
+37 percent, average 1.1 percent. In both years, fi rms’ results were 
evenly distributed between the extremes, with little clustering. A logical 
inference is that the more effi cient fi rms preferred, in good times and 
bad, to achieve extraordinarily high rates of profi t rather than to chase 
market share, and that their less effi cient brethren also held to the com-
mon price level rather than taking the destructive and demoralizing 
course common among less disciplined industries—buying volume and 
illusory cash-fl ow at the expense of already inadequate margins.8
How could the F TC resolve this apparent paradox—on the one 
hand, an ideally competitive industrial structure; on the other, compel-
ling prima facie evidence of pervasive and successful anticompetitive 
behavior? The task was not diffi cult. Adequately funded, armed with 
the state’s authority, and receiving the industry’s reluctant cooperation, 
F TC investigators gathered interviews and documentation and explained 
how the trick was managed. Superimposed on the industry’s structure 
of seemingly autonomous fi rms was a network of organizations—regional 
manufacturers’ associations for each of the main production and mar-
keting districts (New England, New York State, the other Mid-Atlantic 
states, the Midwest, the Upper South, and the Mississippi Valley), and 
national associations for manufacturers of particular products (e.g., gas 
ranges, furnaces). Membership and, crucially, professional leadership 
overlapped. Just six men directed the eleven organizations studied by 
the F TC; one ran fi ve, another two. Above them, and serving as another 
7 Ibid., 10–16.
8 Ibid., 47, 49–53.
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means for experience-sharing and policy coordination, was the National 
Association of Stove Manufacturers (NASM), founded in 1872—one of 
the United States’ oldest trade associations, which many of the local 
members also joined, and whose annual conventions in New York City 
provided an opportunity for the local secretaries to meet and align sec-
tional with national priorities. No membership list for the NASM sur-
vives from the early 1920s, but if we apply a weak test for active partici-
pation (i.e., attending at least one annual convention, 1920–24), we can 
estimate that it included at least half of the industry and most major 
fi rms. The local and sectoral associations increased NASM’s reach even 
further.9
The F TC, of two minds about the benefi ts of cooperation among 
businessmen, concluded that “These associations perform various use-
ful and lawful services, but some of their activities are evidently in re-
straint of trade.” It did not merely produce a report. In subsequent 
years, the Commission continued to pursue individual stove manufac-
turers, investigating and achieving voluntary compliance or cease-and-
desist orders to prohibit specifi c anticompetitive practices on which 
they had also relied for market control. But two signifi cant political 
changes that came to fruition in 1925—the US Supreme Court’s soften-
ing of the hard line it had taken since 1921 against price-controlling 
trade associations; and the establishment of a conservative majority on 
the F TC itself, resulting among other things in abandonment of the 
kind of wide-ranging inquiry to which the stove industry had been 
subjected—probably helped save the stove associations from a general 
prosecution.10
The remainder of this article will explain where this remarkably 
effective system of market regulation came from; how it evolved; and 
why generations of stove manufacturers dedicated themselves to per-
fecting it. There was nothing exceptional about stove makers’ ambivalent 
9 “Lists of Stove Manufacturers” [1922], FTC Investigative File, National Archives; atten-
dance at conventions in NASM Proceedings 49–53 (1920–24). The printed Proceedings—
near-verbatim stenographic transcripts of biannual or, after 1890, annual meetings, a 
c.10,000-page treasure trove of information—are the key sources for the rest of this article.
10 USFTC, Household Stoves, 82–83 [quote]; USFTC, Annual Reports, 1924, 89; 1925, 
236–37; 1926, 20, 104, 119; M. Browning Carrott, “The Supreme Court and American Trade 
Associations, 1921–1925,” Business History Review 44 (1970): 320–38; G. Cullom Davis, 
“The Transformation of the Federal Trade Commission, 1914–1929,” Mississippi Valley His-
torical Review 49 (1962): 437–55 at 448–50. Gerald Berk, Louis D. Brandeis and the Mak-
ing of Regulated Competition, 1900–1932 (Cambridge, 2009), esp. ch. 8, is less persuasive 
about the evolution and impact of the FTC than Himmelberg, Origins of the NRA, chs. 1–4; 
Morton Keller, “The Pluralist State: American Economic Regulation in Comparative Perspec-
tive, 1900–1930,” in Regulation in Perspective: Historical Essays, ed. Thomas K. McCraw 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1981), 56–94, at 77–81; or McCraw’s own Prophets of Regulation: 
Charles Francis Adams, Louis D. Brandeis, James M. Landis, Alfred E. Kahn (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1984), ch. 4, esp. 146–52.
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attitude toward the virtues of competition, or the methods they ad-
opted to mitigate the rigors of the market. When they embarked on 
their a ttempts at price-fi xing toward the end of the post–Civil War 
boom, many other industrial communities of proprietary capitalists were 
doing much the same.11 What was more unusual about the stove trade 
was that it persisted with these attempts for decades, and that it left an 
extensive record of its thinking and behavior. It continued to rely on 
voluntary coordination among autonomous fi rms while many other in-
dustries were treading the road that led, via formal pools, trusts, and 
holding companies, toward the consolidated, oligopolistic corporate 
structures that came to predominate in many sectors of manufacturing 
by the end of the century. Stove makers’ experiments in market regula-
tion never enjoyed any formal status: they were always beyond what the 
law, common or statute, state or federal, would support, though the de-
gree of practical toleration that it offered varied over time. And yet, with 
nothing stronger than a commonly perceived self-interest to rely on, 
these experiments continued for decades, becoming increasingly so-
phisticated until they reached peak effectiveness just in time for the 
F TC to investigate and compromise them.
Forging an Association
In 1871, Giles Franklin Filley owned and ran America’s largest stove 
maker, the Excelsior Stove Works of St. Louis, which he had founded in 
1849. Excelsior made the country’s leading cook stove, the Charter Oak, 
a device that Filley had steadily improved since its invention in the early 
1850s and built into a valuable brand. In the years after the Civil War, 
however, he was a worried man, burdened by enormous debts (over a 
million dollars, or about $200 million in 2011 terms) resulting from 
having backed the unsuccessful speculations of a fellow member of 
St. Louis’s Yankee Republican business and political elite. Ten years’ 
strenuous effort was enough to repay his creditors. It turned Filley, al-
ways a hard-driving businessman, into an even tougher competitor. He 
became more committed than ever to maintaining control of his own 
factory by keeping the Iron Molders’ Union (IMU) outside of it, and 
strenuously defended his most valuable asset, the Charter Oak trade-
mark, against infringement.12
11 William H. Becker, “American Wholesale Hardware Trade Associations, 1870–1900,” 
Business History Review 45 (1971): 179–200, at 182–85, for manufacturers’ behavior in 
other metal-products industries.
12 “Obituary: Giles F. Filley,” NASM Proceedings 29 (May 1900), 191–92; Jeffrey S. Adler, 
Yankee Merchants and the Making of the Urban West: The Rise and Fall of Antebellum St. 
Louis (New York, 1991), 67–69; Lawrence O. Christensen et al., eds., Dictionary of Missouri 
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His personal diffi culties made Filley acutely aware of the problems 
of overcapacity, ruthless competition, and poor profi tability that began 
to affl ict the US stove business at this time. The industry was reaching 
the end of a boom. According to a contemporary estimate, output 
doubled from 1 to just over 2 million units per year between 1860 and 
1870. As production capacity grew in response to profi t opportunities 
during Reconstruction, price and nonprice competition between fi rms 
increased, and rates of return declined. By the early 1870s, the mature 
industry had tapped the country’s last new markets, those of the post-
Emancipation South, and reached the “stagnation” phase of its product 
cycle.13
How were manufacturers to cope with the resulting deterioration 
in business conditions? Filley understood that his fi rm’s salvation de-
pended on the health of the industry as a whole—though Excelsior was 
a relative giant (fi ve or six times larger than the average stove maker, 
producing about 50,000 stoves a year, and employing about 350 men), 
its market share was no more than about 2.5 percent. He therefore de-
cided to do what he could to improve matters for the entire industry. 
But there was no national organization for him to work through. One 
had been formed at a convention in Albany, New York, in 1866 to battle 
the IMU, whose strength had grown in line with the industry’s wartime 
prosperity, but it had been torn apart by the strikes and lockouts that 
followed.14
So Filley had to undertake the work himself. In November 1871, he 
wrote “to the principal Stove Makers of the Country for the purpose of 
getting an expression of opinion as to the propriety of making an ad-
vance in prices for the coming year.” His aim was to gain their coopera-
tion in battling the growing problem of poor profi tability. He argued 
Biography (Columbia, Mo., 1999), 296–98; and Donald G. Southerton, The Filleys: 350 
Years of American Entrepreneurial Spirit (Lincoln, Neb., 2005), esp. 63, 69–70, 72, 83–86, 
97–101, 121, 133. Filley and labor: Andrew Gyory, Closing the Gate: Race, Politics, and the 
Chinese Exclusion Act (Chapel Hill, 1998), 20–21; Charter Oak trademark: “Supreme Court 
of Missouri. Giles F. Filley, Respondent v. A. D. Fassett et al., Appellants [Filley v. Fassett],” 
American Law Register 17, no. 7 (July 1869): 402–11.
13 Jeremiah Dwyer, “Stoves and Heating Apparatus,” in 100 Years of American Com-
merce, ed. Chauncey Depew (New York, 1895), vol. 2: 357–63 at 361, citing John S. Perry’s 
report to the fi rst meeting of the NASM; Howell J. Harris, “Inventing the US Stove Industry, 
c.1815–1875: Making and Selling the First Universal Consumer Durable,” Business History 
Review 82 (2008): 701–33, esp. 731–33, and “ ‘The Stove Trade Needs Change Continually’: 
Designing the First Mass-Market Consumer Durable, ca. 1810–1930,” Winterthur Portfolio 
43 (2009): 365–406, esp. 392–400, on this phase of the industry’s history.
14 Market share calculated from Thomas Dunlap, comp. & ed., Wiley’s American Iron 
Trade: Manual of the Leading Iron Industries of the United States (New York, 1874), 333–
50; “Notes from the Newspapers,” in Collections on the History of Albany, ed. Joel Munsell 
(Albany, 1871), vol. 3: 298–300, for the 1866 convention.
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that consumers could be made to accept an imposed price increase, and 
that there would be no negative effect on aggregate demand. This sur-
prising belief refl ected the industry’s general understanding of its own 
economics. Stove makers thought that the demand for stoves was price-
inelastic, at least in the short term. The purpose of competition within 
the trade, ideally involving everything other than price, was therefore 
to share out a relatively fi xed market among competitors, none of whom 
enjoyed signifi cant cost or productivity advantages over their peers, and 
who could thus afford to adopt a common policy. Filley’s aim was not 
absolute price uniformity, impossible to achieve given the number and 
diversity of producers and products, but rather that all should move up 
together, at the same time, and by the same amount, and also that they 
should stop discounting from their published lists, to prevent buyers 
playing one off against another. Collaborating competitors would retain 
most of their autonomy and fl exibility, but only exercise them within 
agreed limits.15
Filley struck a responsive chord, particularly with his “moral econ-
omy” argument for a fair profi t—“as Stoves are amongst the most im-
portant articles that enter into household use, there is no reason why 
this business should not pay a reasonable profi t to the Manufacturer.” 
About a tenth of the industry’s members, representing about a fi fth of 
production capacity (i.e., generally the larger fi rms), responded, almost 
all of them supportive of a concerted advance, but also favoring the in-
stitutionalization of cooperation. “Most of the smaller houses think a 
convention should be called, and a defi nit [sic] price fi xed, by which all 
should be governed. The older and larger houses seem to doubt whether 
any arrangement that might be adopted in convention would be a long 
time adhered to, but were willing to try any plan that was likely to in-
sure [sic] a reasonable advance.”16
On that basis, the National Association of Stove Manufacturers 
was called into being. In January 1872, informal local meetings dis-
cussed the planned price increase; in February, convention invitations 
were sent out; and in March, at Delmonico’s restaurant in New York, 
the Association was founded, with about a third of the industry’s mem-
ber fi rms represented.17 Two-thirds of the participants were from New 
York and Pennsylvania, half of whose manufacturers attended, but 
there were enough from other sections (a third of the Upper South’s, a 
15 Giles Filley to Marcus Filley (his older brother, a stove maker in Troy, New York) and 
others, 18 Dec. 1871, Box 1, “Targets” folder, Filley Papers, New York State Library, Albany, 
NY (hereafter, NYSL).
16 Ibid.
17 Albert Lyman (New York) to Marcus Filley, 30 Jan. 1872, Box 15, Folder A, Filley Papers, 
NYSL.
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quarter of New England’s, a fi fth of the Midwest’s) that it could claim to 
speak, and hope to act, for the industry nationwide.18
Finding Its Feet: The National Association’s Early Years
Giles Filley ruled himself out as the Association’s president, then 
and later, because the pressures of trading out of insolvency denied him 
the time, and also because he and other activists agreed that the indus-
try had to be led from what was still its major production center, and 
the Association’s main recruiting-ground, the New York Capital Dis-
trict. So the role was accepted by his close collaborator John Strong 
Perry, senior partner in the second-largest stove company in the nation, 
Albany’s Oriental and American Stove Works. Perry was the same age 
as Filley (56), from the same Yankee background, and had pursued a 
similar career in the stove business since the 1840s, having his own 
brush with bankruptcy in the early 1860s and overcoming it by the same 
sort of aggressive business practices.19
As his subsequent conduct would reveal, Perry’s commitment to 
collective action rather than competitive individualism was pragmatic, 
provisional, and selective, but he nevertheless made a compelling case 
for its advantages:
The absence of frequent and friendly intercourse has engendered 
suspicions and jealousies, and these . . . have produced, as a natural 
result, a most unhealthy competition, threatening the very life of the 
trade; for, while the prices of our goods have been brought down 
lower and lower, until some of them have reached a point far below 
the cost of production, that cost has yearly increased so that between 
the two, we have been cut as with a two-edged sword. You will thus 
see, gentlemen, that the time has come for concerted action, for the 
ruin that has already overtaken some will be but the precurser [sic] 
for wider disaster, unless some energetic means are taken to pre-
vent it. I believe these means are to be found in union, and that . . . 
in union is our only safety. To reach this result . . . we should form 
an organization . . . through which there will be an opportunity for 
adjusting differences, for correcting mistakes, for comparing expe-
riences, and for establishing principles of action.20
18 John S. Perry, “The National Association of Stove Manufacturers: Its History and Use-
fulness, and the Processes for Maintaining Its Profi table Perpetuity,” NASM Proceedings 15 
(June 1886): 23.
19 Perry & Co. Stove Works, Albany, NY (1872), broadside, NYSL; William L. Stone, 
“Stoves and Heating Apparatus: Perry & Co., Albany, N.Y.,” in Industrial America; or, Man-
ufacturers and Inventions of the United States (New York, 1876), 450–56; George H. Hazel-
ton, “Reminiscences of Seventeen Years Residence in Michigan, 1836–1853,” Michigan His-
torical Collections 21 (1894): 370–417, at 385–86.
20 Quoted in Stanhope Boal, “President’s Report,” NASM Proceedings 29 (May 1900): 19.
Cooperation and Collusion in the US Stove Industry / 665
Perry and the other leaders intended to build an inclusive organization 
based on active membership participation. They solicited “the sugges-
tions and aid of every man present, and we want every member of the 
craft to join us. We cannot see too much of each other, or be too inti-
mately acquainted. Friendship is far better than enmity and must pro-
duce better results.” The core of this “friendship” was, of course, interest. 
Everything discussed at the founding convention concerned different 
aspects of the mitigation of competition, which would remain the Asso-
ciation’s chief preoccupation for the next six decades.21
Perry was “systematic and methodical in all things,” and a fi rm be-
liever in the value of information—ideally, quantitative data—as a guide 
to action and for clinching an argument. What distinguished the NASM 
from earlier, local, and less formal attempts at price-fi xing was that he 
couched his case for an increase in a detailed cost analysis that sought 
to prove that any price below 6 cents per pound for the cheapest grade 
of stoves, rather than the prices below 5 cents then being realized, would 
be unprofi table. His argument was considered by a representative group 
of prominent manufacturers from the industry’s major centers, who 
recommended it to the meeting. The members “adopted [it] with en-
thusiasm.” They hoped that the agreed advance—to a minimum of 
7.5 cents a pound for basic goods, which would deliver a healthy profi t 
margin—would possess greater legitimacy, both with manufacturers 
and customers, than if it had been based on nothing more than a sense 
of what the market could be made to bear.22
To make their agreement stick, the convention was followed with a 
recruiting drive that raised membership to 157 fi rms, at least three-
quarters of the industry’s members and more than four-fi fths of pro-
duction capacity, within the year. With such solidarity behind it, the 
price policy was “so honestly carried into practice by nearly the whole 
trade that [1872 and 1873] were among the most profi table we ever ex-
perienced.” To help win support, Perry also “scattered” his “printed 
sheets . . . all over the land,” trying hard to persuade the entire indus-
try to analyze and understand its business using his accounting meth-
ods, so that if all agreed not to sell below cost plus a decent markup, 
there should be no risk of a return to a downward spiral of profi tless 
competition.23
21 Quoted in James A. Lansing, “President’s Address,” and Percival W. Elliott, “Secretary’s 
Report,” NASM Proceedings 43 (May 1914): 14, 26.
22 “John S. Perry,” Stoves & Hardware 9, no. 5 (16 Aug. 1886): 3; John S. Perry, “Presi-
dent’s Address,” NASM Proceedings 2 (Feb. 1873): 9.
23 Perry, “The NASM: Its History and Usefulness,” 24; Uriah Hill Jr., NASM Proceedings 
3 (Feb. 1874): 46–47. Perry’s cost estimates were reproduced as 155–66 of the Proceedings, 
in response to demand.
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Perry and others attributed the industry’s restored profi tability to 
their price-fi xing and educational efforts, but these could only work, and 
then only up to a point, because demand was temporarily strong. This 
is what permitted manufacturers to raise the price of common stoves by 
about 30 percent ( less for higher-quality goods). They believed that 
they had escaped or disciplined the market, but Perry was overconfi -
dent when he proclaimed that “We have this whole matter in our own 
hands. The great volume of the business is done by less than one hun-
dred fi rms, and, as they have no foreign competition, the way is clear 
for them to demand a fair return for what they give.” He believed that 
as customers had nowhere else to go, they must accept manufacturers’ 
prices—“All that is required is to let buyers understand that there is a 
bottom to the market, and that they have found it—they are then just as 
well satisfi ed to pay 8 cents as 7.”24 But things were not so simple.
First, for all of its efforts and early promise, the NASM could never 
achieve a high enough level of organization, either in terms of member-
ship density or of collective discipline, in order to fi x prices securely. 
It could not control its own members and prevent them underselling 
one another, and as for the nonmembers, when demand slackened 
after 1873 Perry was forced to acknowledge that “Even the smallest of 
them . . . is able to materially affect our prices.”25
Second, to the extent that the NASM’s price-fi xing succeeded, at 
least in the short term, what it also did was to increase the incentive for 
free-riding or lower-cost fi rms to add capacity and steal market share 
by underbidding, thereby adding to overproduction in the run-up to the 
mid-1870s depression, and perhaps even making the latter worse for the 
trade. All of this reminded stove makers that the laws of supply and de-
mand were not so easily cheated within a competitive business culture.
So far, so familiar. The NASM’s early experience was entirely in 
line with the conventional wisdom about similar attempts by other 
US industries, then and later, to rig their markets. The basic problem 
with “Gentlemen’s Agreements”—which is all that price-fi xing and other 
competition-mitigating rules could amount to, without legal enforcement 
—is that members were not gentlemen when they met one another as 
competitors, whatever they promised and however well they got on 
during NASM conventions. The incentives to cheat were too powerful, 
and sanctions for noncompliance either weak or nonexistent.26 The 
24 Perry, “President’s Address,” (1873): 7.
25 John S. Perry, “President’s Address,” reported in The Metal Worker 3, no. 8 (20 Feb. 
1875): 1.
26 The classic statement of this argument is George Stigler, “A Theory of Oligopoly,” Journal 
of Political Economy 72 (1964): 44–61, critiqued in Margaret C. Levenstein and Valerie Y. 
S uslow, “What Determines Cartel Success?” Journal of Economic Literature 44 (2006): 43–95.
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comparison between the American and the much smaller Canadian 
stove makers’ association was instructive: the latter evolved into a 
genuine cartel, its members bound to one another by contracts which 
fi xed prices, quotas, and trade terms that the law respected, and they 
were disciplined by enforceable fi nes if they transgressed. In the United 
States, even before the Sherman Act, no such formal system seemed 
possible.27
Stove makers, like other competition-plagued proprietary manu-
facturers, were caught in a double-bind. Their industry’s key structural 
features (low barriers to entry, small minimum effi cient scale, weak re-
turns to scale, and ease of growing output quickly without needing 
much extra capital) produced the tendencies toward overcapacity and 
profi tless competition of which they complained and to which they re-
sponded. But these same characteristics also meant that companies 
were too evenly matched against one another for any to be able to as-
sume a dominant-fi rm role and stiffen the market. Detailed fi gures 
compiled in 1874 with Perry’s assistance showed that the industry’s 128 
smaller fi rms, producing up to 1,000 tons a year, its seventy medium-
sized fi rms, producing 1,000 to 2,500 tons, and the fourteen larger 
fi rms, making between 2,500 and 6,000 tons, each controlled about a 
third of a very unconcentrated market.28 In the absence of legally sanc-
tioned cartelization, the natural tendency of NASM members and non-
members alike was therefore to carry on much as before—relying on 
nonprice competition and holding to agreed prices if possible, but al-
ways ready to revert to direct price competition if market pressures or 
opportunities were too compelling.
Perry’s unwillingness to subordinate his own fi rm’s interests to 
what he claimed to be the industry’s collective interests was instructive, 
and corrosive of his authority. He seems to have thought that he could 
have it both ways: at the same time as lecturing about the virtues of sol-
idarity, he carried on in the old competitive style. He quietly bought up 
the controlling patents in the anti-clinker grate (a real breakthrough, 
making it much easier to maintain a continuous fi re) and then attempted 
a hold-up on his own members, from whom he exacted a stiff royalty 
27 Mr. Copp, “Canadian Stove Industry,” NASM Proceedings 3 (Feb. 1874): 24; Edward 
W. Bowditch, “The Canadian Iron Founders’ Association,” NASM Proceedings 17 (Feb. 
1888): 248–54. Martin J. Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 
1890–1916: The Market, the Law, and Politics (Cambridge, 1988), 95–98 esp., disputes this 
conclusion about state and federal law on cartels and cartel-like behavior before the Sherman 
Act, but Tony Freyer, Regulating Big Business: Antitrust in Great Britain and America, 
1880–1990 (Cambridge, 1992), esp. 3–4, 77–80, 85, is more persuasive; see Robert F. Him-
melberg’s discussion of both arguments, “Does Antitrust Matter? A Comparative History of 
Antitrust Policy and the Evolving Corporation in Britain and the United States,” Reviews in 
American History 21 (1993): 273–78.
28 Dunlap, ed., Wiley’s American Iron Trade, 333–50.
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charge if they wished to take advantage of a new technology that con-
sumers demanded without risking costly litigation. They fought back, 
pooling resources to mount a legal defense and break his patents. In 
revenge, and to prevent the Anti-Clinker Association’s leader (one of 
Perry’s Albany neighbors) attending the 1875 convention, Perry had 
him served with legal papers keeping him tied up at home. The result 
was a furious public row, the end of Perry’s presidency, and the com-
mencement of an enormous and costly lawsuit embroiling much of the 
industry for the next several years.
Perry followed this move with another attempted coup, using his 
political connections to secure a monopoly over the cheap labor of the 
inmates of Sing Sing prison (in Ossining, New York), where he built a 
huge foundry for the production of low-cost stoves. Perry’s excuse was 
that he wanted to undercut the IMU, not to underbid his own members:
[H]e did not go to State prison out of spite towards other manufac-
turers [laughter] but went there to make money. . . . [H]e proposes 
to get all he can for his goods. . . . [H]e does not intend to slaughter 
prices; . . . he intends to sell them at the best prices he can, but sell 
them he must.
When that maneuver eventually failed too, partly because stove manu-
facturers joined forces with their trade-union enemies in lobbying the 
state legislature to restrict prison labor, Perry relocated production 
to the low-wage, nonunion South instead, and even experimented with 
using “colored” labor in what had until then been a lily-white industry. 
Perry’s tactical fl exibility clearly indicated that his own fi rm’s profi tabil-
ity was always his main objective: he displayed the stove manufacturer’s 
normal competitive instinct, albeit in an extreme form.29
In the standard narrative of loose, voluntary combinations among 
manufacturers, what normally happened after the disappointment of 
initial attempts at market manipulation was collapse and disintegra-
tion.30 However, the NASM was not destroyed by its inability to live 
up to its original promise, nor even by Perry’s repeated treachery. Mem-
bers understood the strategic problems that they faced and engaged in 
29 NASM Proceedings 4 (Feb. 1875), reported in The Metal Worker 3, no. 8 (20 Feb. 
1875): 2–3; “Fashions Even in Stoves,” The Sun [New York] 27 July 1884, 6, for the anti-
c linker suit; NASM Proceedings 7 (Jan. 1878): 39–41, 46–51 [quotation at 49], 53–55; and 8 
(Jan. 1879): 73–89; and John S. Perry, Prison Labor; Showing the Proportion of Convict to 
Citizen Labor in the Prisons of the State of New York, and of the United States (Albany, 
1885) for the prison labor issue; “From Albany to Chattanooga,” Atlanta Constitution, 8 Dec. 
1886, 4, “The New South: Transfer of the Albany Stove Works to Tennessee,” Atlanta Consti-
tution, 22 Dec. 1886, 4, and William D. Kelley, The Old South and the New (New York, 1888), 
9, 78–81.
30 Alfred D. Chandler Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American 
Business (Cambridge, Mass., 1977), esp. 141–48 (railroad cartels), 316–18 (industrial cartels).
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open debate to fi nd answers they could live with. They even rebuilt rela-
tions with Perry, who returned to active membership in 1879 and was 
reappointed to the Board of Managers in 1880. They still valued his ad-
vice on cost accounting or labor relations, even while fi ghting him in 
the courts and the state legislature. After their unsuccessful experiment 
under his leadership, they knew that they could not create an effective 
price-fi xing combination, given the constraints of the law, and most of 
them concluded that they did not even want to. They believed in free-
dom of action—it was, after all, their freedom that was at stake—and 
even in competition, up to a point. They were comfortable with a situa-
tion where the most that the NASM could produce were nonbinding 
recommendations that had, at best, some moral force. They knew that 
they could not discipline one another, let alone the growing number of 
nonmembers, so most of them were content to lower their sights and 
aim for something more achievable, but still worthwhile.
First, the NASM continued with a watered-down form of indicative 
price-setting, which was useful for steadying members’ behavior as the 
market slumped, together with the exchange of information about an-
ticipated production and price policies. Members’ business decisions 
came to be based on better intelligence, something they valued.
Second, the NASM provided members with a useful, indeed the 
only available, forum for discussion, experience-sharing, and occasion-
ally action in areas of common interest, notably lobbying Congress 
about federal policies affecting their industry. For example, when stove 
makers, with their nationwide distribution networks, became plagued 
by fraudulent retailers taking advantage of the federal bankruptcy law 
of 1867 during the depression of the 1870s, they played a leading role in 
the campaign leading to its repeal in 1878.
Third, it provided them with some of the less tangible benefi ts of 
fellowship. What seems to have kept the NASM afl oat through the de-
pression of the 1870s was that the core of active members found that 
they enjoyed one another’s company. The burdens of membership were 
small—no hired staff, no regular dues ( just occasional whip-rounds at 
conventions), and no rules. Instead, there was the opportunity to get to 
know one’s competitors better and have a good time together. Conven-
tions were occasions for memorable drinking bouts, jaunts, and lavish 
dinners. Good fellowship was initially spoken of by the NASM’s leaders 
instrumentally—it would help the Association function better. But it 
seems to have become almost an object in itself.31
31 William H. Tefft, NASM Proceedings 8 (Jan. 1879): 52. The NASM fi ts comfortably into 
the class of organizations, common at the time, that Louis Galambos called “dinner-club as-
sociations” in Competition and Cooperation: The Emergence of a National Trade Associa-
tion (Baltimore, 1966), ch. 2, esp. 21, 25, 33–36: low dues, no offi ce, no staff, and entirely de-
pendent on membership participation.
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The Association held two annual meetings until 1891, one in winter 
primarily for business (to discuss prices and production in advance of 
the making and selling season), the other in summer mostly for jollity, 
and when they cut back to a single convention, it was the winter gather-
ing that they dropped. Conventions attracted between fi fty and seventy 
members through the late 1870s. The value of sociability was quickly 
appreciated. As Sherman Jewett of Buffalo, Perry’s successor as presi-
dent, put it, 
without it we should soon tumble to pieces; but as I believe that we 
shall be an association for many years, . . . we should combine our 
meetings with pleasure, and give our wives and daughters the privi-
lege of going with us once a year to . . . a watering-place . . . [I]t will 
go a great way toward keeping up the interest.
NASM get-togethers, even the most frivolous, also afforded stove man-
ufacturers an opportunity for developing trust among competitors, cre-
ating or strengthening bonds of loyalty, and laying foundations on 
which the building of the organization could proceed. As John Rath-
bone of Albany, Jewett’s successor, argued, 
When this Association was commenced, there was no class of manu-
facturers in the United States, I am sure, in which there was so little 
kind feeling and so little harmony. But what has been the result? . . . 
[W]e have come in contact with each other, learned to know each 
other, come to refl ect a little and love one another.32
The Association Habit Grows
Love alone might not have kept the Association together, but fortu-
nately there was always a suffi cient admixture of interest too. Perry’s 
repeated efforts through the late 1870s and early 1880s to corner the 
market in the foundation patents for market-leading base-burner stoves 
and anti-clinker grates led to the formalization of what started out as 
just a defensive gathering of men on the receiving end of his lawsuits, 
and turned into a permanent body, the Equity Protective Association. It 
functioned by combining manufacturers’ resources against any attempt 
by one of their peers to exploit his intellectual property rights too fl a-
grantly: joint legal defense hugely increased the cost and risk in enforc-
ing a patent claim, and raised the incentive for manufacturers to issue 
licenses on reasonable terms instead, or even accept piracy as a fact of 
32 Jewett, NASM Proceedings 3 (Feb. 1874): 56; Rathbone, NASM Proceedings 7 (Jan. 
1878): 28. Cindy S. Aron, Working at Play: A History of Vacations in the United States (New 
York, 1999), 66, for this new sort of “convention-vacation.”
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life. The industry’s patent wars were not ended, but they were calmed 
down (with the perhaps paradoxical effect of reducing the incentive to 
innovate, by diminishing realizable gains; this at least was the com-
plaint of one of NASM’s leaders).33 This organization operated on the 
NASM’s margins—it could not be an Association activity, because it set 
members at one another’s throats, companies regularly swapping the 
roles of defendant and litigant in patent battles—but the conventions 
provided a convenient occasion for its meetings.
Early in the next decade, the revival of the IMU had a similar effect 
in reminding stove makers of the benefi ts of collective action, and the 
usefulness of the NASM as a forum within or alongside of which they 
could organize for it. The NASM had an unwritten rule prohibiting the 
consideration of labor questions, partly a memory of the way the strikes 
and lockouts of 1866–67 had torn its predecessor apart. It was also sen-
sitive to the facts that its members were differently situated, with some 
of them running union shops and others closed to union members, and 
that they had different appetites for confl ict. Several prominent stove 
makers were even honorary trade union members themselves, refl ect-
ing their artisan background and active role in setting up the IMU. 
Three of the NASM’s founding member fi rms were actually producers’ 
cooperatives, relics of skilled molders’ many attempts to escape from 
the wage system during the Reconstruction period. Those that did not 
quickly fail eventually devolved into ordinary joint-stock companies, 
but they provided another means whereby labor activists were recruited 
into the ranks of proprietors and managers, alongside the normal pro-
cesses of small-scale entrepreneurship.34
When necessity demanded, however, the unwritten rule did not 
prevent the NASM from having extensive discussions about the prob-
lem of how best to confront the IMU’s (and Knights of Labor’s) grow-
ing strength. The contest with labor in the early 1880s helped increase 
the NASM’s membership, and stimulated their involvement: 160 men, 
the largest number ever, attended the 1886 summer meeting where 
preparations for the coming battle were discussed. A new organization 
was erected alongside the NASM, with an overlapping membership and 
a single purpose: the Stove Founders’ National Defense Association 
(SFNDA). Its fi rst president was Henry Cribben, a Chicago stove maker 
whose background was very different from that of the older generation 
of Yankee merchants-turned-manufacturers who had founded the 
NASM and led it ever since. Cribben, born in 1834 on the Isle of Man, 
33 Lazard Kahn, NASM Proceedings 34 (May 1905): 164–68, 174.
34 Jonathan Grossman, “Co-Operative Foundries,” New York History 24 (1943): 196–210, 
at 206, and William Sylvis: Pioneer of American Labor (New York, 1945), ch. 9.
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and brought to the United States as a young orphan, had been a stove 
molder since 1850, a charter member of the IMU in 1858, and remained 
a dedicated labor activist and politician until he reached middle age. 
But his experience running a successful producers’ cooperative in Roch-
ester, New York, helped persuade him to become an entrepreneur in his 
own right. Cribben’s fi rm joined the NASM in 1873, and he played an 
active part within it until the end of his business career more than thirty 
years later.35
Cribben’s views on labor relations were complex. Though he was 
critical of the Molders’ leaders and many of their members, he remained 
open-minded about how to handle them. He endorsed “arbitration” 
(negotiation) as the best way to settle “the price of labor” rather than 
sharing his colleagues’ preference for leaving it to the market. During 
the depression of the early 1880s he regretted “very much that we are 
compelled to reduce the wages of the laboring classes” on the progres-
sive grounds that it resulted in cutting “the purchasing power of our 
patrons.” He was also appalled at the cost and violence of strikes, and 
wanted to avoid them if possible. But he shared his fellow employers’ 
attachment to “the control and management of our own business,” 
and was certain that employers collectively could create “a citadel of 
strength” that the unions would hesitate before attacking, and then fail 
to overcome. After they had been defeated, and a truce had been en-
forced, the time would come to deal with the underlying causes of 
confl ict.36
Cribben’s role was to mobilize his fellow employers, give them con-
fi dence, and devise and execute their new strategy. He described his tal-
ents with undue modesty: “I am not a talker, talking is not my forte,” 
though in fact he was highly articulate and persuasive; he saw himself 
instead as an organizer. “That is the business I was raised in. I can run a 
‘strike’ on either this side or that, and I can do it successfully. I have 
tried it, and I know.”37
His members soon knew it, too. Though only about half of the 
NASM membership, or about a quarter of the industry’s fi rms, joined 
the SFNDA, that was enough. With their support, he masterminded a 
35 J. Clayton Youker, ed., The Military Memoirs of Captain Henry Cribben of the 140th 
New York Volunteers (Chicago, 1911), iii; “Henry Cribben,” NASM Proceedings 40 (May 
1911): 284–86 [obituary]. Cribben gave an account of his early working life in “Labor Organi-
zation,” NASM Proceedings 21 (May 1892): 67–69; and 23 (May 1894): 154–61.
36 NASM Proceedings 12 (Feb. 1883): 56; 14 (24 June 1885): 49–50; 15 (2 June 1886): 74; 
“Address by the President of the Stove Founders’ National Defense Association at the First 
Semi-Annual Meeting, Held at New York, Feb. 1, 1887,” in Stove Founders’ National Defense 
Association (SFNDA), Addresses by the President and Others (Chicago, 1887), 3–16, quota-
tion 16.
37 NASM Proceedings 17 (Feb. 1888): 68–69—Cribben’s report after the great Bridge & 
Beach strike.
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confrontation with the IMU that spread from plant to plant, eastward 
and northward from St. Louis through the early spring of 1887, impos-
ing huge costs on the union and its members and eventually forcing 
them to concede. The employers were prepared, and had chosen the 
time and the occasion: as Cribben boasted when his own Chicago plant 
was closed down, he “had a stock which would last six months, and . . . 
the trouble came at the best possible time for most of the stove mak-
ers,” because it even helped them to empty their overfl owing ware-
houses and maintain prices in a downturn. The employers’ solidarity 
with one another forced their men to walk out, turning what was in fact 
a reversal of the union’s boycott tactics into a public relations coup: 
“This throws all the odium upon the men.” Outside observers did not 
understand that what was happening was a well-planned, rolling lock-
out, though Cribben was not reluctant to tell them: “[It] is simply fol-
lowing the example laid down by the labor unions in numberless in-
stances, and it has proved . . . remarkably successful.”
This strike is the fi rst of its kind in the history of the world. Two or-
ganizations, both formed for the same purpose—protection—are en-
gaged in a fi ght for supremacy. The stove manufacturers are accused 
of putting up a job; of trying to raise the price of stoves; of forcing 
the men to strike, and various other things. Of course we are doing 
these things. That is what we are organized for, and I have no hesi-
tation in saying so.38
The most interesting thing about the SFNDA is what it did after achiev-
ing victory. Cribben’s advice to his members was to try to create some-
thing more stable than an armed truce:
Would it not be far better for each to treat the other with respect 
and come as intelligent beings and reason together; and if the busi-
ness will warrant it and the men in our employ feel they are entitled 
to an advance grant it, or if the trade will not warrant it, convince 
them of the fact and let them recede from their demands like honest 
men and be satisfi ed. . . . I feel assured if such an arrangement can 
be consummated, peace, harmony and prosperity in the future is as-
sured to both parties.39
It took another three years of occasional confl ict, through a period of 
economic recovery, before the IMU’s members could be persuaded to 
38 “Big Strikes on Hand: The Illinois Iron Molders Demand More Wages,” New York 
Times, 10 Apr. 1887, 10; “The Molders’ Strike: Indications that the Manufacturers Will Win,” 
New York Times, 30 Apr. 1887, 1.
39 Cribben, “Address by the President of the Stove Founders’ National Defense Associa-
tion at the First Annual Meeting, Detroit, June 21, 1887,” in SFNDA, Addresses by the Presi-
dent and Others, 17–45 at 45.
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accept the employers’ invitation to talk, but there then began one of the 
earliest and most durable national collective bargaining relationships 
in US history, the Chicago Agreement. This relationship was one of the 
few aspects of the contents of this article that attracted much public in-
terest (from the National Civic Federation, US Industrial Commission, 
and US Commission on Industrial Relations) or scholarly attention.40 
Its importance here is its effect on stove founders’ growing attachment 
to collective problem-solving, rather than on labor relations per se. The 
SFNDA gave them another object lesson in the value of associational 
activity to set alongside the Equity Protective Association, and a much 
more tangible one than the NASM itself had offered in its fi rst fi fteen 
years. But members understood that, without the NASM, they could not 
easily have built or sustained either working organization. The SFNDA 
also accustomed them to paying higher dues in return for service, and 
provided them with something the NASM, as a pure membership orga-
nization, had always lacked: a permanent, professional secretary dedi-
cated to association work. The two overlapping organizations shared 
the cost, and both gained administrative capacity thereby.41
The SFNDA also made the NASM’s own work of managing the mar-
ket much easier. The effect of its negotiations with the IMU and other 
unions through the 1890s and 1900s was to standardize district and na-
tional wage rates, taking the largest element in manufacturers’ costs 
(after raw materials) out of competition altogether. Regular nationwide 
wage movements also provided both a rationale for price increases, and 
cost pressure on manufacturers to comply.
Enforcement of price-fi xing agreements had always been impossi-
ble for the NASM, given its voluntary character and incomplete cover-
age of the industry, and a legal environment that was unhelpful even 
before it became hostile, with the passage of the Sherman Act and sub-
sequent Supreme Court rulings. The IMU labored under no such limita-
tions, and increasingly took the responsibility for compelling stove 
foundries outside of the SFNDA to implement agreed wage rates and 
working rules. It was able to do this because its strong relationship with 
40 See esp. John P. Frey and John R. Commons, “Conciliation in the Stove Industry,” Bul-
letin of the Bureau of Labor 12, no. 62 (Jan. 1906): 124–96; George E. Barnett, “Report on 
the Agreement Between the Molders’ International Union and the Stove Founders National 
Defense Association” (21 Dec. 1914) in Research Collections in Labor Studies: The Wilson 
Administration and American Workers: The US Commission on Industrial Relations, 1912–
1915, Unpublished Records, ed. Melvyn Dubofsky (Frederick, Md., 1985), Reel 9; Clarence E. 
Bonnett, Employers’ Associations in the United States: A Study of Typical Associations 
(New York, 1922), ch. 2; and Russell S. Bauder, “National Collective Bargaining in the 
Foundry Industry,” American Economic Review 24 (1934): 462–76.
41 In Galambos’s terms, the NASM began to evolve into a service association; Competition 
and Cooperation, ch. 3.
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SFNDA provided it with a secure membership and fi nancial base, facili-
tating its recruitment of more than 90 percent of the skilled molding 
workforce within the industry as a whole by the early 1900s. The SFNDA 
also refused to take into membership fi rms whose competitive practices 
disturbed the market, thus depriving them of strike insurance and in-
creasing their level of risk, and inducing them to comply with NASM 
norms.
Of course, stove manufacturers paid a price for this joint regulatory 
system: they lost their (in any case, limited) ability to escape depen-
dence on skilled labor and traditional working practices, and to cut 
their labor costs, at a time of substantial mechanization and productiv-
ity growth in the rest of the foundry sector. Some resented their loss of 
control of the workplace, and of opportunities for increasingly neces-
sary modernization. The SFNDA’s offi cers, however, were determined 
to ignore or overrule their dissident minority, so great was their invest-
ment in the “live and let live” strategy that brought them peace, modest 
prosperity, and stability, as their industry stagnated.42
Organization Building and a Missed 
Opportunity, c.1885–1905
As stove makers were developing the industry’s joint regulatory sys-
tem, they were also exploring and progressing along alternative tracks. 
From the 1880s through the 1900s, the NASM pursued two different 
approaches to market regulation, as well as, from the early 1890s, sup-
porting the SFNDA’s Chicago Agreement, which turned out to be so 
productive and to complement the Association’s own work. One option 
was to build on its own earlier experiments in collective self-regulation; 
another, which did not seem so different at the time, was to try a new 
and promising tack: consolidation.
Consolidation was on the stove industry’s agenda as early as 1877, 
when one member suggested that “we might do as the tube-pipe men 
42 Margaret L. Stecker, “The Founders, the Molders, and the Molding Machine,” Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 32 (1918): 278–308; SFNDA, Report of Committee on Machin-
ery (25 Sept. 1908); National Founders’ Association, Stove Founders Pray for Relief (De-
troit, 1909); and “Stove Founders Again Succumb,” The [Open Shop] Review 6, no. 2 (Feb. 
1909): 7–12. Howell J. Harris, “The Rocky Road to Mass Production: Change and Continuity 
in the US Foundry Industry, 1890–1940,” Enterprise & Society 1 (June 2000): 391–437, esp. 
413, and “ ‘The Stove Trade Needs Change Continually,’ ” explain why the stove trade was in 
any case resistant to mechanization. Open shop sentiment among stove founders also led to 
the cause célèbre of Buck’s Stove and Range Co. v. Samuel Gompers et al., 1907–14, brought 
by Buck’s chief executive James W. Van Cleave, NASM vice president and president of the 
anti-labor National Association of Manufacturers. This went all the way to the US Supreme 
Court twice. See Daniel R. Ernst, Lawyers Against Labor: From Individual Rights to Corpo-
rate Liberalism (Urbana, 1995), esp. 126–32.
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have done—consolidate all the foundries in one concern, and have them 
run under one management and divide up the profi ts,” as the way to es-
cape excessive competition. Another agreed that the answer to the root 
problem, overcapacity, was obvious: pooling and quota-setting, “each 
manufacturer to state how many stoves he makes of a particular class, 
and then ascertain the amount manufactured in the United States, and 
then allot to each foundry how many stoves to make, and confi ne the 
founders to making no more than that.” But the next word in the tran-
script is revealing: “Laughter.” At the time, the proposition seemed ab-
surd. Yet from 1887 onward it kept coming back. There was an increas-
ing number of successful precedents in other industries, and as Jacob 
Smyser, the then-president, put it, “There is no reason upon earth why 
the stove business should not be ‘pooled.’ ” Infl uential colleagues were 
more doubtful. Henry Cribben asked, “Did it ever occur to you that . . . 
Congress might pass a law to prevent that?” Smyser was not prepared 
to be put off: “We won’t anticipate that trouble. We’ll wait until we get 
there.”43 They never did.
Smyser’s idea of combination was designed to deal with what he 
and many others agreed to be the industry’s fundamental problem: ex-
cessive, unprofi table production, which destroyed any possibility of ef-
fective market discipline. The answer was to consolidate and “limit pro-
duction. This done, the balance takes care of itself.” Nothing else would 
serve:
[C]oncoct schemes, inaugurate compacts, establish arrangements 
with forfeitures, and you have at last but temporarily stayed the cur-
rent of competition which seemingly, poisoned by rest soon breaks 
forth anew with venomous fury. The mind tires in vain search for 
relief outside of absolute “consolidation.” Competition can only be 
limited by concentrating the management! You can only limit the 
management by massing your interests.44
Smyser’s argument was that the elimination of overcapacity and also 
the “modern follies” of excessive nonprice competition in design and 
marketing would result in great cost savings. His notion of consolida-
tion was not particularly revolutionary. It was principally designed to 
deal with the problem of imposing collective discipline on hundreds 
of independent proprietary fi rms, but envisaged leaving most of their 
operations unchanged. “Each member would continue to conduct his 
manufacture and sale as heretofore, subject to the direction of the 
mother head as to terms and prices. No leading stove would lose its 
43 J. O. Merriam, NASM Proceedings 6 (Jan. 1877): 63; James Spear, NASM Proceedings 
6 (June 1877): 40; discussion, NASM Proceedings 16 (Feb. 1887): 128.
44 Smyser, presidential address, NASM Proceedings 17 (Feb. 1888), 39, 41.
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identity or the former owner his position if he merited it” (emphasis 
added). Proprietors would simply turn into shareholders, free as largely 
autonomous plant managers to carry on with most forms of nonprice 
competition against their partners in the combine.45
Smyser’s scheme was half-baked. He saw the possibility of making 
economies by, for example, collective purchasing, but otherwise his vi-
sion of the industry’s future after consolidation was remarkably similar 
to its present state, only less competitive and more profi table—“the 
greatest success, with the minimum of discomfort and risk.” His was a 
classic vision of a rent-seeking horizontal combination—“it is the cure 
for our evils. It is the short cut.” John Perry, one of his supporters, gen-
erated a set of optimistic forecasts to justify the strategy: consolidation 
would produce gains for all of the industry’s stakeholders, including a 
10 percent reduction in stove prices, a 20–30 percent increase in wages 
and salaries, and a steady 20 percent return on capital. But, perhaps 
surprisingly, Smyser could not deliver his members’ backing.46
Part of the problem was his undiplomatic openness about one nec-
essary step toward balancing capacity and demand, and eliminating 
overproduction: closing down the weaker fi rms among the consolida-
tors. “Will that not exterminate some of them?” a perceptive member 
asked. “I would do it after properly compensating them! You can manu-
facture all the stoves needed by two-thirds of the stove manufacturers 
in the country to-day. Think of the money you could save by doing that.” 
The less profi table and effi cient fi rms should simply be “obliterate[d].” 
Their owners would be compensated with stock; if they were not com-
petent managers, who could fi nd a place in the new organization, they 
could do something else, “go and hoe corn or dig potatoes” or perhaps 
“go and clerk for some fellow.”47
This was not an attractive option for proprietors completely identi-
fi ed with their own enterprises, especially because the future value of 
their stock would depend on the managerial competence and trustwor-
thiness of those of their former competitors left running the show, and 
on the doubtful ability of a consolidated business to deliver on Smyser’s 
and Perry’s golden promises. As even the most persistent and sophisti-
cated advocate of consolidation, Lazard Kahn of the Estate Stove Co., 
Hamilton, Ohio, put it, “if I had to face two contingencies, the one 
being that of conducting the stove business in a rotten concern and 
the other in digging potatoes, I would stick to the rotten concern.” 
Where business was a way of life, the vision of a future as a redundant 
45 Ibid., 39, 44.
46 Ibid., 38; NASM Proceedings 20 (7 May 1891): 118, 124.
47 Discussion on consolidation, NASM Proceedings 20 (7 May 1891): 123–24, 125.
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rentier, declared surplus to requirements by one’s peers, was unattrac-
tive. Advocates of combination could have sweetened the pill if they had 
been able or willing to offer cash, at proprietors’ infl ated valuations, 
rather than stock, but this would have increased the cost of the merger 
and sabotaged the prospects of the new business, which were in any 
case not as glowing as Perry imagined.48
For there was another obstacle that defeated Smyser’s initiative. 
Having decided to start the process in the industry’s Midwestern sec-
tion, which had emerged as its new center with the rapid decline of Al-
bany and Troy in the late 1880s, Smyser interested English capitalists 
in fi nancing and organizing region-wide consolidation. Forty-two fi rms 
sent men to meet the representatives of these potential investors in Cin-
cinnati, bringing seven years’ fi nancial reports and subjecting them-
selves to a searching “due diligence” scrutiny. The outcome was unex-
pected: the fi rms were ready to join a consolidation, on the right terms 
and at what they considered a fair price, but the fi nanciers were ap-
palled at the poor profi tability their audit process uncovered.
They were just simply bewildered . . . “Of all the businesses that we 
have examined . . ., the stove business is in worse condition than any 
. . . I advise you people to do something.” I said: “My friend, that is 
just what we are after.” (Laughter.) They were disgusted and went 
away. 
They could not afford to be interested in an industry that, even after 
consolidation, would not meet their target rate of return and justify 
the investment required. Ironically, the industry’s “rotten” state—the 
problem from which Smyser and others sought deliverance—made it 
an unpalatable target for a buyout. Evidently the outsiders did not 
have as much confi dence as some stove makers did in the profi t-
g enerating magic of a horizontal merger without any fundamental 
reorganization.49
None of the subsequent attempts, launched by the industry’s own 
members rather than relying on outside fi nance and expertise, did 
much better, resulting in nothing apart from a couple of small mergers. 
Each of these brought a handful of fi rms together into loose local or re-
gional holding companies, miniature versions of what Smyser had en-
visaged, that left former owners as managers of their old establishments, 
producing their old model lines, even preserving their old trademarks, 
48 Kahn in ibid., 132–33. Kahn published his views as a widely circulated pamphlet, The 
Stove Industry and the Ethics of Consolidation (Lancaster, Penn., 1893).
49 Smyser’s and Henry Cribben’s accounts of this meeting are in NASM Proceedings 20 
(May 1891): 121–22, 129–32, and NASM Proceedings 32 (May 1903): 47–48, reviewing a 
dozen years’ repeatedly unsuccessful consolidation attempts.
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and consequently not transforming the industry’s structures and strate-
gies in any fundamental respects. 50
So the NASM’s leaders pursued a parallel track from the dawn of 
the Trust Era right through the Great Merger Wave and into the New 
Era of the 1920s, initially as a holding operation while they waited for 
consolidation to happen, but eventually in its own right; some even 
concluded that its relative success was what fi nally killed the demand 
for consolidation within the industry itself, rather than the frustration 
of repeated failure. This was the system of coordination of independent 
fi rms through a network of overlapping associations, which the F TC’s 
investigators uncovered at the peak of its effectiveness.
The movement for organizational deepening of the NASM began in 
1883, alongside the parallel discussions leading to the formation of the 
SFNDA. It built on the memory of transitory and informal local bodies 
for price-fi xing and union-busting that had existed for decades before 
the national organization came on the scene, but most of which faded 
away when the NASM occupied the fi eld. In the industry’s largest cen-
ters, however, they survived: the New York Capital District, and Phila-
delphia and its hinterland. By the early 1880s, the Albany and Troy 
founders—the activist core of the NASM—were using their local organi-
zation to get business done between semi-annual meetings, notably lin-
ing up support across the Midwest in order to get a price rise agreed in 
convention to stick in everyday competitive practice, thereby netting 
members an estimated $200,000 in additional revenue at negligible 
expense. The Pennsylvania group, although well-organized locally, felt 
the lack of regular interaction with a national coordinating body to as-
sist them, notably with timely reports on the state of the market to pro-
vide the context within which they could decide price and production 
policies. “With the present situation we rely wholly upon the annual or 
semi-annual meetings of the National Association for our information. 
. . . [Between conventions] we were at sea, not having any statistics or 
information to govern our action.”51
In due course, the NASM responded to this evidence of how a 
branch organization could make national policy more effective, and also 
of demand from a well-established local group for the services that only 
a national body could provide, by appointing infl uential members in all 
major stove-manufacturing centers tasked with reviving or creating 
50 These produced the Pittsburg Stove & Range Co. and the American Stove Co., a combi-
nation of Chicago and St. Louis fi rms and the most likely original for the fi ctional Consoli-
dated Stove & Range Co. of North America, the evil protagonist in the only novel about the 
stove industry, Robert Updegraff’s Captains in Confl ict: The Story of the Struggle of a Busi-
ness Generation (Chicago, 1927).
51 NASM Proceedings 12 (Feb. 1883): 46–49, quotation 48.
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local associations. Their purposes were to be trade-practice regulation 
and price-fi xing, with the NASM playing a coordinating role.52
In 1887, the NASM took a further step, building on the experience 
of the SFNDA’s successful coordination of the local implementation of 
its national strategy. The SFNDA was organized into districts (mirror-
ing the structure of its adversary, the IMU), and had a well-paid, full-
time professional secretary shared 50:50 with the NASM and dedicated 
to making both Associations more effective. Now, the NASM divided it-
self into districts, too, and encouraged each to appoint a full-time secre-
tary of its own, to serve and mobilize his members and coordinate pol-
icy with the national secretary and executive.53
This turned out to be a step too far, because it implied a greater 
readiness on the part of ordinary members to pay dues and accept col-
lective discipline than was in fact the case, so the leadership made an-
other realistic retreat and laid their emphasis on cheaper, less formal 
local structures instead. As Smyser argued, “They are the sheet anchor 
of the business, these Local Associations. We announce principles here, 
but the effective work has got to be done in our own districts, among 
competitors at home—getting our inspiration from this body, and going 
back to our homes, and there getting in our effective work.”54
The next element in the NASM’s alternative-track strategy was also 
one of Smyser’s enthusiasms, and represented a logical development of 
the work with which Giles Filley and John Perry had inaugurated the 
Association: encouraging the development of a common understanding 
of costs, a uniform procedure for determining them, and an ethic or 
policy that chasing volume at the expense of margin was destructive of 
the individual and collective interest in achieving a fair rate of return. 
Local associations could complement the national organization’s work 
of smoothing the asperities of competition by developing relation-
ships of trust and even friendship among business rivals; they could 
also reach smaller fi rms, or those otherwise not inclined to join the 
National’s work. And they could serve as the transmission-belt for a 
shared cost-consciousness from the NASM’s activists to the industry as a 
whole. If consolidation, as a route to the imposition of discipline on the 
industry, was not an immediate option, then the combination of a pro-
fessional central secretariat with increasingly active local associations 
focusing on the implementation of agreed cost-accounting standards 
and methods would serve as an acceptable interim substitute. It would 
52 NASM Proceedings 15 (Feb. 1886): 49–50, 93–94.
53 NASM Proceedings 16 (Feb. 1887): 113–29, “Central Bureau” plan at 130–31.
54 NASM Proceedings 18 (Feb. 1889): 197–98.
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improve levels of self-discipline among autonomous fi rms and channel 
their competitive energies into more acceptable nonprice rivalry.55
Discussions about how to calculate costs preoccupied stove manu-
facturers from the Association’s outset, but their somewhat amateur ef-
forts to reach agreement about principles and methods led to no con-
sensus, and therefore no basis for common action. So in 1886 they 
turned to an outside expert, Captain Henry Metcalfe, pioneer of sys-
tematic management, in charge of the Watervliet Arsenal, which was 
conveniently just across the Hudson from Troy, who provided them 
with a sophisticated criticism of methods then employed by the indus-
try. Metcalfe’s direct infl uence is hard to assess—the NASM’s new sec-
retary was himself an expert accountant—but the Association was soon 
publishing the fi rst of a series of increasingly detailed guides to the or-
ganization of cost accounts, the principles on which they should be 
based, and how to use them.56
If all fi rms paid much the same for basic raw materials; if they were 
constrained, by the IMU and the Chicago Agreement, to use the same 
labor-intensive manufacturing techniques, and to pay the same rates of 
wages; if they calculated their costs in the same way; and if they could 
be persuaded, by the social pressure and educational infl uence of local 
associations, not to sell below cost—then, without obvious collusion, their 
prices would settle within a tolerably narrow range. As William Pfahler, 
Philadelphia-based advocate of more effective collective organization 
(consolidation if possible, cooperation if not), put it in 1891, “the ques-
tion of Cost Accounts is one which is so intimately connected with the 
question of co-operation that it is impossible to separate them.”57
The fi nal ingredients in the work of the evolving NASM developed 
through the 1890s on the strong foundations of common action in labor 
relations and cost-accountancy. Under the rule of the Chicago Agree-
ment, all stove founders had to negotiate piece prices with union com-
mittees in the same way, and increase those prices by a uniform per-
centage if the annual national conference so determined. In fact, 
however, some of them were paying a lot more (or less) for a similar 
job than their nearby competitors, because they had started out with 
55 This increasingly common strategy’s rationale is explained well by John R. Bowman, 
“The Politics of the Market: Economic Competition and the Organization of Capitalists,” Po-
litical Power and Social Theory 5 (1985): 35–88, at 51.
56 Metcalfe, NASM Proceedings 15 (Feb. 1886): 98–118; he had just published The Cost of 
Manufactures and the Administration of Workshops, Public and Private (New York, 1885), 
and went on to use the stove industry data supplied to him, probably by Perry, in his cele-
brated American Society of Mechanical Engineers address “The Shop Order System of Ac-
counts,” reprinted as 333–43 of the 3rd (1894) edition.
57 NASM Proceedings 20 (May 1891): 108–13, quotation 109.
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different costs, and the IMU was determined to equalize molding prices 
(upwards) within competitive local market areas, to satisfy its members 
and realize the Agreement’s full potential. Stove founders did not wel-
come this pressure, but its effect was to put them even more nearly on 
the same footing with regard to labor costs.58
Second, even as increasing numbers of stove founders (NASM 
members and nonmembers alike) began to compute their costs using 
the Association’s regularly revised, extended, and improved “Cost Book” 
and “Formula,” and assisted by its peripatetic “Cost Expert,” it became 
clear that an accounting system that was suitable for determining a 
fi rm’s overall rate of profi t on broad categories of goods was not capable 
of producing defi nitive answers to the question of how much any partic-
ular stove should cost. This left a great deal of room for competitors to 
disturb orderly markets by offering particular models at low prices, 
thereby reintroducing price competition by the back door. In the late 
1890s local associations began to apply themselves to eliminating this 
evil too, not by formula but by the detailed comparison of one stove 
against another, with the aim of reaching a near-utopian situation 
where all stoves of the same size, quality, weight, basic design, added 
features, etc., from any manufacturer within a local market area, should 
be offered to the consumer at exactly the same price.
Achieving this objective, even imperfectly, was diffi cult and time-
consuming, but it paid off in the further reduction of the scope for price 
competition among manufacturers. It was, as Lewis Moore of the Joliet 
Stove Co. explained, “the stepping-stone to the prosperity of the stove 
maker.” But for local associations to be able to deliver equalization, 
than which there was “nothing that has ever been done in the stove 
business that makes profi t so easy to get,” they had to bite the bullet 
and accept that a full-time, paid secretary was essential: “No man not 
giving his entire time to this work could possibly attempt to practically 
equalize prices,” asserted Franklin Sheppard, head of one of the oldest 
fi rms in Philadelphia, the best-organized district. Local associations got 
the message, so that in the early 1900s the industry fi nally adopted the 
structure of complementary national and local bodies, with overlapping 
membership and a cadre of paid offi cials linking them all together, that 
the F TC would fi nd in perfect working order two decades later.59
58 NASM Proceedings 24 (May 1895): 73–77.
59 W. J. Myers, “Equalization of Prices: Cannot a Uniform Rule Be Established That Will 
Be Fair and Equitable?” NASM Proceedings 29 (May 1900): 117–23 and discussion, 123–43; 
Moore, “Equalization—What is the Fairest Method for Determining the Relative Value of Dif-
ferent Goods? Is it Advantageous and Benefi cial to the Stove Manufacturers?” NASM Pro-
ceedings 32 (May 1903): 95–97, quotation 95 and in discussion of “Equalization of Prices,” 
NASM Proceedings 34 (May 1905): 157; Sheppard in same discussion, 156.
Cooperation and Collusion in the US Stove Industry / 683
Success and Vulnerability: 
The NASM in the Progressive Era
Surveying the results of a generation of organization-building in 
1905, George Mitchell of the Pittston Stove Co. had every reason to 
sound satisfi ed: “it is in the ranks of the associations you will fi nd the 
real money makers. . . . [T]he best insurance policy we hold is our mem-
bership in our local association.” Freed from the pressure to compete 
on price, manufacturers could follow the more agreeable and industry-
traditional course of nonprice competition, and—a new emphasis in the 
Age of Effi ciency—pursue profi t, not just in the market for their goods, 
but by “better methods and results” in the administration of their en-
terprises, where the NASM helped them too, acting as an experience-
sharing forum.60
Thanks to national coordination, they were also protected against 
the risk that, however disciplined stove manufacturers within a local 
association might have become about not competing with one another 
on price or terms of doing business, their efforts might be undermined 
by companies from another district, with different prices and rules, in-
vading their profi table home turf and underselling them. Proprietors 
were persuaded to respect prevailing prices, discounts, and other terms 
of trade when, as happened decreasingly often, they chased nonlocal 
markets rather than sticking to their more profi table home patch. The 
competitive national market dating from the 1840s, with fi rms exploit-
ing cheap, effi cient transport networks to sell their goods continent-
wide, devolved into a patchwork of regional markets by the 1900s. 
Under the shelter of their regulatory umbrella, stove makers were en-
abled to protect themselves against excessive price declines during re-
cessions, coordinate price movements on the upswing, and to achieve a 
modicum of stability and profi tability within their mature industry as 
they transferred capital and capacity from their traditional product lines 
into new and more promising areas (e.g., steel ranges, central heating 
boilers, gas appliances), or even out of the industry altogether and into 
new ventures (e.g., in Detroit, automobiles and parts).61
Contemporaries recognized the effectiveness of the NASM’s work. 
When David Kinley of the University of Illinois surveyed a wide range 
60 Mitchell, “The Value of Local Associations,” NASM Proceedings 34 (May 1905): 181–
86, quotations 182, 186.
61 Mitchell, “How to Bring about Co-operation between Local Associations Where Their 
Members Sell Goods Outside the Territory of Their Own Local Association,” NASM Proceed-
ings 35 (May 1906): 159–63. Changes in share of industry output from NASM Secretaries’ 
Reports in Proceedings 1896–1914; movement of capital, Donald F. Davis, Conspicuous Pro-
duction: Automobiles and Elites in Detroit, 1899–1939 (Philadelphia, 1988), 46, 49–50, 
67–68.
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of businessmen and others on behalf of the Chicago Conference on 
Trusts in 1899, his informants included stoves among goods that “can-
not be bought outside of trusts,” despite the fact that the industry’s 
ownership and management structures had scarcely been affected by 
two decades of consolidation talk and one of apparently fruitless ac-
tion.62 From the perspective of Kinley’s sources, including jobbers and 
retail merchants, the stove industry’s alternative track had reached a 
signifi cant destination: without overt national price-fi xing, the Associa-
tion had managed to do a good enough job of organizing nationwide 
price movements, local price-fi xing, and promoting an ethos of “fair 
competition” among its members, that buyers could no longer play one 
supplier off against another.
“Fair competition” was the kind of competition that delivered a 
“fair” rate of return. As NASM president William J. Myers of Peekskill’s 
Union Stove Works put it in 1910, 
In ascending the ladder of competition it is unfair to wear spiked 
shoes and try to lacerate the hands of the man just below us, and it 
is unfair to use force to pull the man above us off the ladder alto-
gether. It is apt fi nally to cause us all to wear spiked shoes, and all to 
use force with the result that down will come competitors, ladder 
and all.63
But to outsiders, “fair competition” looked suspiciously like collu-
sion and conspiracy against the public, particularly the consumer, in-
terest. That same year, the NASM and its Midwestern branch lost their 
entire Missouri membership, who resigned in a hurry and en masse, 
and the Association had to decline an invitation to hold the annual con-
vention in St. Louis. This was because the state’s antitrust law was so 
draconian that “we have been advised if we held meetings to discuss 
trade matters that we would be violating the laws . . . and the punish-
ment for doing so is very severe, as it provides for confi scating property 
and imprisonment.” The entire Western Stove Association had to aban-
don efforts at equalizing selling prices, because of advice that state and 
federal antitrust law prohibited it.64
The NASM believed that antitrust laws should not apply to it be-
cause it was not a monopoly, did not even “attempt to regulate prices, 
or do anything that controls trade conditions”; or so, rather inconsis-
tently, it claimed, in published proceedings where much of the business 
62 Civic Federation of Chicago, Chicago Conference on Trusts: Speeches, Debates, Reso-
lutions, List of the Delegates, Committees, Etc. Held September 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 18th, 
1899 (Chicago, 1900), 530.
63 Myers, presidential address, NASM Proceedings 39 (May 1910): 22–23.
64 Stanhope Boal, NASM Proceedings 39 (May 1910): 246–27.
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was and always had been devoted to these very topics. It was, as Myers 
put it, part of “our great industrial fabric” on which “our advanced posi-
tion in the industrial world” depended, and which antitrust policy must 
not sacrifi ce.65
But by the middle of the Progressive Era it was in fact clear that the 
NASM stood on shaky legal ground, despite the assurances of 1915’s 
president, James A. Lansing of the Scranton Stove Works, that:
We meet together for the purpose of elevating the standard and im-
proving the conditions of our business, with no control whatever 
over the regulation of prices or other matters except as we as honor-
able gentlemen consider these things in the interest of the craft as a 
whole. [Applause.] No charge has been made, no charge can be 
justly made that this Association has in any way ever restricted trade 
or controlled prices to any extent whatever. Every member is a free 
citizen to exercise his own judgement and except as we meet to-
gether for the good of the craft in a general way we are simply a 
body of friendly manufacturers.66
There was some hope that they might fi nd friends in high places. The 
Association’s honored guest that year, Wilson’s Secretary of Commerce 
William C. Redfi eld, was Albany born and bred, the son of a NASM 
member and a former commercial traveler himself. But there was also a 
kind of fatalism. As Lazard Kahn, still advocating consolidation, put it, 
“the statesmen who decreed that American industrial war between 
those engaged in the same business is a patriotic duty and a source of 
profi t” were among the industry’s continuing problems, and uncertainty 
about the practical meaning of the Sherman and Clayton Acts meant 
that the way ahead was unclear.67
By the beginning of the First World War, the stove industry was in 
obvious decline, and disappearing from public view. The dedicated 
trade press that had covered it since the 1870s had closed down in the 
1900s, or refocused on central heating in order to survive. The main-
stream press, which had, for example, provided detailed coverage of the 
Great Lockout of 1887, was no longer interested, except in bankruptcies 
and the occasional obituary. But solid-fuel stoves remained a household 
necessity for rural Americans and for urban dwellers who lived beyond 
the reach of manufactured and natural gas networks, or were locked by 
their relative poverty into dependence on the simplest heating and 
cooking technologies. Wartime and immediate postwar conditions—a 
65 N. H. Burt, “Systematic Ascertainment of Stove Values vs. Haphazard Comparisons,” 
NASM Proceedings 39 (May 1910): 123–29 at 125; Myers, presidential address, 18.
66 Lansing, “President’s Address,” NASM Proceedings 44 (May 1915): 78.
67 NASM Proceedings 44 (May 1915): 111.
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50 percent reduction in raw material supplies, its consequences man-
aged through the NASM as the industry’s liaison with the War Indus-
tries Board; a savage capacity cut, accompanied by drastic simplifi ca-
tion of the industry’s costly, proliferating product lines (an economizing 
and modernizing measure that the NASM had only been able to advo-
cate, not implement, in normal times); masses of pent-up demand, and 
the ability to ratchet up prices—these brought one last surge of artifi -
cial prosperity, which the NASM’s associational network enabled its 
members to enjoy to the full. In the process, they generated the political 
heat that focused Congress’s—and consequently the F TC’s—attention 
on them.
The effect of the F TC’s investigation is diffi cult to ascertain. It was 
just one element in the uncertain regulatory environment that troubled 
US business in the early 1920s. But by the time that public policy had 
moved in the direction of toleration and even encouragement of associ-
ational activities, short of overt price-fi xing, largely as a result of well-
organized business lobbying and the sympathetic intervention of Secre-
tary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, the NASM was already a shadow of 
its former self. It had stopped compiling statistics of output and prices, 
cut back on its cost-accounting services, and “clarifi ed” its purposes to 
spell out that they did “not contemplate any price control or any control 
of normal healthy competition, and adjustments would not be secretly 
accomplished.”68
What was left was an organization that did less for its members and 
accordingly attracted less support. Membership collapsed, and conven-
tion attendance declined to levels not seen since the depression of the 
1890s, before falling back even further to those of the late 1870s. But 
how much of this was because the NASM’s strategic retreat to stave off 
a threatened regulatory assault that never came to fruition destroyed its 
own raison d’être, and how much because the industry itself was in ter-
minal decline, its urban markets hollowed out by the rapid advance of 
electrifi cation and oil-fi red central heating, is impossible to determine. 
The latter was certainly the principal reason for the industry’s decade-
long crisis, but the Association’s loss of effectiveness meant that it was 
no longer able to ease its members’ burden of adjustment, as it had 
managed before the war. By 1929, the Association’s last recorded meet-
ing, the representative of one of its oldest members, Bridge & Beach of 
St. Louis—the fi rst stove maker west of the Mississippi in the 1840s, the 
center of the Great Lockout in 1887—lamented that “if ever the industry 
needed it, this is the time.” Competition had “reached the ‘cut throat’ 
68 Secretary’s report on trade association activities, NASM Proceedings 51 (May 1922): 
22–24; on statistics, NASM Proceedings 53 (May 1924): 39, and costs, 41; Report of the Ex-
ecutive Committee on constitutional revision, NASM Proceedings 54 (May 1925): 77.
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stage—terms, there are none, and it is a race, each one for himself, and 
devil take the hindmost.” Almost sixty years after the Association had 
been established, conditions in the industry were back to square one, 
and the “fair competition” that had been built by decades of effort, and 
thrived until the state’s intervention in 1922–23, was no more than a 
fond memory.69
Conclusion
Why should readers be interested in a small organization whose 
peak membership scarcely exceeded 150 fi rms, in an early maturing 
and increasingly peripheral industry directly employing no more than 
15,000 to 20,000 people, which rarely came to public notice even when 
it was thriving, and that quietly expired more than eighty years ago? 
Because its story casts light on some of the larger concerns of scholars 
of US business, notably the nature and purposes of the trade associa-
tions that proliferated in the United States in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries; why some cartels fail and die quickly, whereas 
others succeed and survive; the role of joint regulation in helping some 
competitive industries to organize their own affairs; the modalities of 
the turn-of-the-century consolidation movement; and the infl uence of 
the state in shaping business strategies and structures.
There is little recent scholarship on the family of organizations of 
which the NASM was a founding and, until the early 1920s, quite suc-
cessful member, and some of what there is, is not very useful. Political 
scientists Gerald Berk and Mark Schneiberg classify it as having been in 
the 1920s a relatively advanced “developmental association,” which 
they defi ne as “collaborative learning systems, which used deliberation, 
cost accounting, and benchmarking to shift competition from volume 
and cutthroat pricing to innovation and improvement.” But as we have 
seen, by this time it was in fact falling apart, once its price-fi xing role 
had been compromised. Their analysis is far too rosy-hued, and accepts 
the arguments of salesmen of New Era associationalism at their own 
misleading valuation. In the NASM’s case, price-fi xing was clearly its 
central purpose, methods improvement never more than a distant sec-
ond, and innovation nowhere to be seen. It is thus more accurate and 
helpful to think of the NASM as a cartel, despite its leaders’ repeated 
but implausible denials that it was any such thing.70
69 Proceedings of the National Association of Manufacturers of Heating and Cooking 
Apparatus 58 (May 1929): 10.
70 Berk and Schneiberg, “Varieties in Capitalism, Varieties of Association: Collaborative 
Learning in American Industry, 1900 to 1925,” Politics & Society 33 (2005): 46–87 at 47; 
also in Berk, Brandeis, ch. 6.
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According to Margaret C. Levenstein and Valerie Y. Suslow, the 
most thorough analysts of the reasons for success and failure in cartels, 
there are few unambiguous explanations for their effectiveness and du-
ration, or the reverse. They emphasize the diffi culty of coming up with 
defi nite conclusions, and that “as seems so often to be the case in study-
ing cartels,” particular explanations “are bad for cartel stability—unless 
they aren’t.” But it seems clear that most of the stove manufacturing in-
dustry’s key characteristics (notably the large number of fi rms, limited 
market concentration, highly heterogeneous nature of products, and 
low barriers to entry) were indeed not normally correlated with the for-
mation of effective, durable cartels. Any successful cartel has to over-
come a common core of challenges—“coordinating the behavior of all 
cartel participants on mutually consistent, collusive strategies”; moni-
toring that behavior “to detect and deter defections”; and “preventing 
entry (or expansion) by noncartel fi rms.” All of these tasks become 
more diffi cult in an industry like the NASM’s. However, Levenstein and 
Suslow provide a helpful explanation for why this rule, too, has its ex-
ceptions: “successful cartels have operated in a wide variety of indus-
tries by developing organizations that can overcome these challenges,” 
particularly trade associations.71
The structural characteristics of the stove-making industry did in-
deed present leaders and members with enduring obstacles to effective 
collective action. One of the key tasks of any cartel—controlling entry or 
expansion by nonmember fi rms—they never even attempted, and the 
others only ever gained indirect and approximate solutions. But the in-
dustry’s structural characteristics also generated the persistent hunger 
for the mitigation of competition that was the NASM’s key organiza-
tional resource, and motivated leaders and members to stick together 
and build their Association through decades of experimentation. The 
Association itself then turned into the key explanation for why good-
enough price fi xing and other anticompetitive practices could be devel-
oped without a formal cartel, and in an environment where, even with-
out hostile state intervention, one would in any case have been likely to 
fail. The prior existence and deliberate cultivation of a culture of non-
price competition; the building of trust among leaders, members, and 
(some) nonmembers; the management of expectations about what the 
organization could and could not achieve; and the ability to learn from 
71 Levenstein and Suslow, “What Determines Cartel Success?” University of Michigan 
Working Paper 02-001 (21 Jan. 2002), 16 [http://www.umass.edu/economics/publications/
econ2002_01.pdf], and “What Determines Cartel Success?” Journal of Economic Literature 
44 (2006): 43–95, esp. 44, 67–69, 73–74, 86. Bowman, “The Politics of the Market,” further 
explains how trade associations can make cartel-like behavior possible in settings not other-
wise favorable to cartel functioning and survival.
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experience—all of these appear to have been crucial to the NASM’s sur-
vival and growing success, just as much as they were to some of the 
other cartels in Levenstein and Suslow’s study where an effective trade 
association seems to have provided both the glue and the lubricant in a 
community of competitors. In a somewhat circular fashion, then, the 
NASM’s organizational biography and its adaptive character were key 
explanations for its success, and that success explained both its own 
persistence and, perhaps, the ability of a large number of otherwise 
marginal fi rms to survive in a stagnant and unconcentrated industry 
well into the twentieth century. This article’s narrative method is thus 
the most appropriate way of explaining the NASM’s history as an evolv-
ing process.
There was nothing unusual, and little original, about the NASM’s 
intentions and methods. It was formed at a time—the depression of the 
1870s, the start of the long defl ation—when concern about excess ca-
pacity, destructive competition, and low profi tability was general among 
US manufacturers, and more or less formal attempts at price-fi xing, 
capacity-reduction, and quota-setting were among their common re-
sponses. The failure of most of these initiatives, because of problems of 
voluntary compliance and the diffi culty of enforcement without solid 
legal backing, led to the series of experiments in the restructuring of 
industries’ forms of ownership and control that started out with the 
“trust” and ended up with the holding company or tight corporate 
merger.
The NASM of the 1870s was at least a qualifi ed failure, on its own 
terms—it quickly discovered that it could not make the economic 
weather in its own industry—but it did enough to persuade a hard core 
of members to sustain it. It was this enduring commitment, and its con-
sequences, that began to distinguish the NASM from other unsuccess-
ful, short-lived associational efforts. Stove manufacturers never lost 
sight of their original and principal object, the mitigation of price (and 
some nonprice) competition. The promotion of good social relations 
and the exchange of experience among business rivals were always in-
tended to help achieve it, as well as being valuable in themselves.
Then, in the early 1880s, they found additional reasons to work to-
gether to achieve common objectives—protecting one another against 
some of their fellows who were trying to use patented innovations in 
order to secure an unacceptable margin of competitive advantage; and, 
even more signifi cantly, the threat posed to managerial control and en-
terprise profi tability by an over-mighty craft union. The SFNDA was a 
path-breaking and, unlike its parent body, an unusually disciplined and 
effective organization, largely because its labor opponent provided it 
with both a model and an enduring raison d’être. It was also blessed 
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with strategic fl exibility: under the leadership of a cadre of self-made 
entrepreneurs, most of whom had climbed from the molder’s sand heap 
into the manager’s offi ce, it fought its way to an armed truce with the 
IMU, and then built an early and unusually successful experiment in 
joint regulation of the whole industry. This solved a number of the 
NASM’s own compliance problems in the key areas of price-fi xing and 
the control of competition, as well as anesthetizing labor confl ict. 
Here, too, the stove industry fi ts into a pattern, though most other joint-
regulatory arrangements devised at the same time were in local-market 
industries (apart from that for bituminous coal’s Central Competitive 
Field) not facing the same kind of coordination task as the NASM, with 
its hundreds of member and nonmember fi rms scattered right across 
the industrial belt; they were also much less durable and effective.72
The narrative of the NASM’s failed fi fteen-year effort to participate 
in the consolidation movement is also not exceptional. Most of the 
many contemporary and subsequent studies of “trustifi cation” concen-
trate, understandably, on industries that achieved consolidation. The 
study of something that did not happen is less compelling as well as 
more diffi cult; the survival of copious evidence of stove makers’ pro-
longed discussions about their own nonevent is just a happy accident. 
But we know from those other studies that stove makers’ motives for 
and expectations of consolidation were entirely conventional, and also 
that the kind of “trust” they envisaged—a loose horizontal combina-
tion among fi rms in peripheral industries, involving minimal interfer-
ence with ex-proprietors’ continuing day-to-day control of their own 
enterprises—was a common, and generally unsuccessful, version of what 
even the “Great Merger Movement” produced.73
The failure of stove makers to achieve consolidation by their own 
efforts also demonstrates the truth of Wharton School professor Ed-
ward S. Meade’s contemporary observation, based on extensive re-
search including some on the stove industry itself: “It is next to impos-
sible to form a trust in a caucus of manufacturers.” The crucial failure 
thus appears to have been the fi rst one, when the NASM’s leaders had 
72 John R. Bowman, Capitalist Collective Action: Competition, Cooperation, and Confl ict 
in the Coal Industry (Cambridge, 1989); David Brody, “Market Unionism in America: The 
Case of Coal,” ch. 4 in his In Labor’s Cause: Main Theme on the History of the American 
Worker (Oxford, 1993); William Graebner, “Great Expectations: The Search for Order in Bi-
tuminous Coal, 1890–1917,” Business History Review 48 (1974): 49–72; Robert Max Jack-
son, The Formation of Craft Labor Markets (Orlando, FL, 1984), for construction and print-
ing; Andrew Wender Cohen, The Racketeer’s Progress: Chicago and the Struggle for the 
Modern American Economy, 1900–1940 (Cambridge, 2004), on regulatory unionism in 
l ocal-market industries.
73 William Z. Ripley, ed. and intro., Trusts, Pools, and Corporations (Boston, 1905), still 
the best case-study collection; Jeremiah W. Jenks, The Trust Problem (New York, 1907), esp. 
ch. 2, “The Wastes of Competition,” summarizes the conventional wisdom.
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interested outside fi nanciers in reorganizing the industry, but it proved 
unattractive to them. After that, there was little prospect: short-run ob-
stacles to achieving practical agreement among self-interested individ-
uals always trumped the consensus about long-term objectives. This 
was a problem in game theory, and its solution always evaded them, 
particularly because the incentives for consolidation declined through 
the 1890s as the NASM’s and SFNDA’s strategies delivered a service-
able alternative.74
The fi nal respect in which the NASM’s singular story fi ts in with 
what we know about the process and patterns of business consolidation 
in the United States is that they were very sensitive to state interven-
tion. Stove makers were used to thinking of the federal government as a 
distant problem and at the same time as a potential resource, which 
provided Association leaders with one of their enduring arguments for 
united action—lobbying. The politics of the tariff and later of railroad 
rate regulation, both of them seriously affecting prices and costs, always 
required stove makers to speak with a common voice if they were to 
hope to be heard. So, too, did the administration of patent law, a partic-
ular concern of an industry that relied so much on intellectual property 
rights in its preferred style of nonprice competition.
Thus, the Association and its members were always politically 
aware, and discussions of price-fi xing and consolidation were always 
informed by what they thought the law allowed. Historians of the Great 
Merger Movement and its aftermath have long understood the appar-
ently paradoxical impact of the Sherman Act, as interpreted by the Su-
preme Court, on the strategies that companies and corporate promoters 
pursued in the 1890s and 1900s. Large-scale horizontal integration, 
often taking advantage of New Jersey’s permissive incorporation laws, 
emerged as a safer and better alternative than the legal makeshifts 
(pools, trusts, and holding companies) on which earlier anticompetitive 
behavior had depended. They have also noted the second paradox of 
evolving Sherman Act jurisprudence, that while it was encouraging and 
enabling tight corporate mergers, it became increasingly hostile to sur-
viving cartels. The NASM obviously felt vulnerable to this tendency in 
antitrust policy through the Progressive Era, as its leaders’ steadfast but 
dishonest denials that they engaged in anything as crude as price-fi xing 
indicate. Thus, the F TC investigation of 1922–23, and the NASM’s self-
limiting response, emerge as a good illustration of the way in which fed-
eral intervention, even when all it amounted to was fact-fi nding backed 
by the vague threat of further action that never actually happened, was 
74 Meade, Trust Finance: A Study of the Genesis, Organization, and Finance of Indus-
trial Combinations (New York, 1903), 84–85, 106.
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capable of shaping entrepreneurial behavior and affecting the fate of an 
industry. The result was not the “Losing to Win” that Thomas McCraw 
and Forest Reinhardt detected in US Steel’s strategic response to the 
threat of antitrust enforcement, but something much less tolerable: 
“losing to lose.”75
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